Appendix

A1 Data and Variable Construction

Sample Overview

Table A-1 presents the sample composition by survey program.

Table A-1: Sample Composition by Survey

Survey	Respondents	Countries	Waves	Years
LAPOP AmericasBarometer	260,592	22	12	2004–2018
Afrobarometer	198,938	46	4	2011–2022
AsianBarometer	77,663	21	5	2005–2021
World Values Survey (Europe)	14,570	24	3	2005–2022
Total	551,763	109	–	2004–2022

Summary Statistics

See Table A-2.

Attitudinal Variables (Independent Variables)

All attitudinal variables are coded as binary indicators where 1 indicates expression of a non-democratic attitude. See Table A-3.

Participation Variables (Dependent Variables)

All participation variables are coded as binary indicators where 1 indicates participation. See Table A-4.

Aggregation

For country-level summaries that pool across outcomes, we construct an inverse covariance weighted (ICW) index following Anderson (2008). Let $\mathbf{Y} = (Y_1, \ldots, Y_K)'$ be a vector of K standardized participation outcomes with covariance matrix $\mathbf{\Sigma}$. The ICW index is:

Table A-2: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Missing	% Missing
Panel A: LAPOP (Latin America, US, Canada)					
Participation Outcomes					
Voted	246,234	0.747	0.435	14,358	5.5
Community Meeting	250,917	0.291	0.454	9,675	3.7
Party Meeting	236,481	0.152	0.359	24,111	9.3
Protest	166,111	0.086	0.281	94,481	36.3
Campaign	153,132	0.318	0.466	107,460	41.2
Non-democratic Attitudes					
Justify Coup (Crime)	188,033	0.423	0.494	72,559	27.8
Justify Coup (Corruption)	185,847	0.417	0.493	74,745	28.7
Democracy Not Best	247,670	0.173	0.379	12,922	5.0
Panel B: Afrobarometer (Africa)					
Participation Outcomes					
Voted	198,938	0.693	0.461	0	0.0
Community Meeting	198,938	0.647	0.478	0	0.0
Protest	198,938	0.341	0.474	0	0.0
Non-democratic Attitudes					
Accept Military Rule	198,938	0.213	0.409	0	0.0
Panel C: Asian Barometer (Asia)					
Participation Outcomes					
Voted	75,834	0.773	0.419	1,829	2.4
Contact Official	77,663	0.233	0.423	0	0.0
Campaign	75,801	0.237	0.425	1,862	2.4
Protest	77,663	0.098	0.297	0	0.0
Non-democratic Attitudes					
Accept Military Rule	77,663	0.221	0.415	0	0.0
Prefer Strong Leader	77,663	0.280	0.449	0	0.0
Panel D: World Values Survey (Europe)					
Participation Outcomes					
Voted	13,507	0.551	0.497	1,063	7.3
Petition	13,303	0.172	0.377	1,267	8.7
Boycott	7,707	0.092	0.290	6,863	47.1
Non-democratic Attitudes					
Accept Army Rule	13,526	0.390	0.488	1,044	7.2
Prefer Strong Leader	2,333	0.449	0.498	12,237	84.0

Table A-3: Operationalization of Non-democratic Attitudes

Variable	Survey	Question wording	Coding
Justify coup (crime)	LAPOP	Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military to take power by a coup détat. Would a coup be justified when there is a lot of crime?	1 = Justified; 0 = Not justified
Justify coup (corruption)	LAPOP	Would a coup be justified when there is a lot of corruption?	1 = Justified; 0 = Not justified
Democracy not best	LAPOP	Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. (1–7 scale)	1 = Disagree (1–3); 0 = Agree (5–7)
Accept military rule	Afrobarometer	The army should come in to govern the country. (1 = Strongly disapprove to 5 = Strongly approve)	1 = Approve/Strongly approve (4–5); 0 = Otherwise
Accept military rule	Asian Barometer	The military should come in to govern the country. (1 = Strongly agree to 4 = Strongly disagree)	1 = Agree/Strongly agree (1–2); 0 = Otherwise
Prefer strong leader	Asian Barometer	We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.	1 = Agree/Strongly agree (1–2); 0 = Otherwise
Prefer strong leader	WVS	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. (1 = Very good to 4 = Very bad)	1 = Good/Very good (1–2); 0 = Otherwise
Accept army rule	WVS	Having the army rule. (1 = Very good to 4 = Very bad)	1 = Good/Very good (1–2); 0 = Otherwise

Table A-4: Operationalization of Political Participation

Variable	Survey	Question wording	Coding
Protest	LAPOP	In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?	1 = Yes; 0 = No
Community meeting	LAPOP	Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? (1 = Once a week to 4 = Never)	1 = Any attendance (1–3); 0 = Never (4)
Party meeting	LAPOP	Meetings of a political party or political organization? (1 = Once a week to 4 = Never)	1 = Any attendance (1–3); 0 = Never (4)
Protest	Afrobarometer	Attended a demonstration or protest march during the past year. (0 = No; 1–3 = Yes, frequency)	1 = Yes (1–3); 0 = No (0)
Community meeting	Afrobarometer	Attended a community meeting during the past year. (0 = No; 1–3 = Yes, frequency)	1 = Yes (1–3); 0 = No (0)
Protest	Asian Barometer	Have you ever attended a demonstration or protest march? (1 = Once; 2 = More than once; 9 = Never)	1 = Yes (1–2); 0 = Never
Contact official	Asian Barometer	Have you ever contacted a government official? (1 = Yes; 2 = No)	1 = Yes; 0 = No
Petition	WVS	Signing a petition. (1 = Have done; 2 = Might do; 3 = Would never do)	1 = Have done (1); 0 = Otherwise
Boycott	WVS	Joining in boycotts. (1 = Have done; 2 = Might do; 3 = Would never do)	1 = Have done (1); 0 = Otherwise

$$\text{ICW} = \frac{\boldsymbol{\iota}'\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1}\mathbf{Y}}{\boldsymbol{\iota}'\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1}\boldsymbol{\iota}} \tag{A-2}$$

where $\boldsymbol{\iota}$ is a $K \times 1$ vector of ones. This weighting scheme gives more weight to outcomes that are less correlated with others, maximizing the information extracted from the set of measures while addressing the multiple comparisons problem.

A2 Robustness to Individual-Level Controls

To assess whether the main findings are driven by compositional differences in who holds Non-democratic Attitudes, we re-estimate our baseline specification including individual-level controls. Specifically, we add gender, age, and education (standardized within country-

wave) to the right-hand side of equation (1). Table A-5 presents results with and without these controls. Findings are nearly identical.

Table A-5: Regression Results: With and Without Individual Controls

Outcome	Treatment	No Controls	With Controls	N
LAPOP (Americas)				
Voted	Coup (crime)	−0.031 (0.005)***	−0.006 (0.004)	172,521
Community	Coup (crime)	0.003 (0.004)	0.010 (0.004)**	177,999
Party mtg	Coup (crime)	0.004 (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)*	173,795
Protest	Coup (crime)	0.001 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	119,039
Campaign	Coup (crime)	−0.032 (0.009)***	−0.023 (0.008)***	120,033
Voted	Coup (corrupt)	−0.032 (0.006)***	−0.007 (0.004)	170,436
Community	Coup (corrupt)	0.006 (0.004)	0.013 (0.004)***	175,850
Party mtg	Coup (corrupt)	0.007 (0.004)*	0.009 (0.004)**	171,723
Protest	Coup (corrupt)	0.006 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	117,290
Campaign	Coup (corrupt)	−0.026 (0.008)***	−0.020 (0.007)***	119,384
Voted	Dem not best	−0.047 (0.009)***	−0.029 (0.006)***	215,975
Community	Dem not best	−0.015 (0.005)***	−0.011 (0.005)**	221,198
Party mtg	Dem not best	−0.006 (0.004)	−0.004 (0.004)	211,598
Protest	Dem not best	−0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	145,830
Campaign	Dem not best	0.003 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	137,924
Afrobarometer (Africa)				
Voted	Military rule	−0.025 (0.007)***	−0.016 (0.006)***	191,014
Community	Military rule	0.009 (0.004)**	0.007 (0.004)*	191,014
Protest	Military rule	0.032 (0.008)***	0.030 (0.008)***	191,014
Asian Barometer (Asia)				
Voted	Military rule	0.004 (0.012)	0.004 (0.013)	66,250
Campaign	Military rule	0.023 (0.014)*	0.017 (0.013)	66,224
Protest	Military rule	0.044 (0.021)**	0.039 (0.023)*	68,032
Contact	Military rule	0.023 (0.019)	0.032 (0.022)	68,032
Voted	Strong leader	−0.009 (0.008)	−0.018 (0.008)**	66,250
Campaign	Strong leader	0.027 (0.014)**	0.014 (0.012)	66,224
Protest	Strong leader	0.056 (0.021)***	0.043 (0.024)*	68,032
Contact	Strong leader	0.047 (0.021)**	0.043 (0.026)*	68,032

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Controls include gender, age, and education (standardized within country-wave). All models include country and wave fixed effects.

A3 Electoral Participation Results

The main text focuses on non-electoral participation, as it maps more directly onto the concept of civic engagement. For completeness, here we present results using the same specifications but for self-reported voting in the last election and campaigning in the last election.

Pooled Electoral Coefficients

Figure A-1 presents pooled coefficients for the self-reported voting outcome across all regions and all attitudinal measures. Effects are similarly mixed for Asia, and Europe. Conversely, they are decidedly negative for Latin America and the US/Canada.

Country-Level Voting Coefficients

Figure A-2 shows country-level coefficients for self-reported voting. Non-democratic attitudes are associated with *lower* voting rates in most countries, particularly in the US/Canada and Latin America (100% negative) and Africa (65% negative).

V-Dem Polyarchy and Voting

Figure A-3 plots country-level voting coefficients against V-Dem polyarchy scores, with flexible GAM spline fits. As with non-electoral participation, there is no consistent moderating effect of democracy level on the voting–autocratic preference relationship. The negative association between autocratic preferences and voting is not systematically stronger in more democratic countries.



Figure A-1: Pooled coefficients for electoral-centered participation (voted, campaign, petition) by region and autocratic preference measure. Points left of zero indicate that autocratic citizens participate less. Compare to non-electoral participation in Figure 1.



Figure A-2: Country-level coefficients for voting only. Points left of zero indicate countries where autocratic citizens vote less. Compare to non-electoral participation in Figure 2.



Figure A-3: Country-level voting coefficients vs. V-Dem polyarchy scores. Spline fits show no consistent moderation by democracy level.